the schools. The accountability system has remained weak in Indonesia's school system, which is reflected by inadequate information flow to parents, as well as seemingly low parental awareness of the need to hold schools accountable. The accountability arrangement of the Indonesian school system currently puts more emphasis on top-down supervision and monitoring by government supervisory bodies.
The findings show that although the scope of schoolbased management in Indonesia is limited, it has begun to help schools make the right decisions on allocation of resources and hiring additional (non-civil servant) teachers, and to create an enabling environment of learning, including increasing teacher attendance rates. These aspects are found to have significantly positive effects on student learning outcomes.
I. Introduction and conceptual framework
Governments around the world are introducing a range of strategies aimed at improving the delivery of education services. One such strategy is to decentralize education decision making by increasing parental and community involvement in schools, which is commonly known as school-based management (SBM). The argument in favor of SBM is that decentralizing decision-making authority to parents and communities fosters demand and ensures that schools provide the social and economic benefits that best reflect the priorities and values of those local communities. An increasing number of developing countries are implementing SBM reforms aimed at empowering principals, teachers, and parents, or at strengthening their motivation, thereby enhancing their sense of ownership of the school. Many of these reforms have led to greater involvement of communities and parents and, in turn, have had a direct influence on educational quality.
In particular, it has been found that increased participation, autonomy, and accountability are the three most important changes associated with improved quality of education and better learning outcomes.
The 2004 World Development Report (WDR) -Making Services Work for Poor
People‖ (World Bank 2003) provides a conceptual framework for this phenomenon. The framework is presented as a three-cornered relationship between citizens, politicians, and service providers. The service provision and accountability relationships between these actors is complex, as even within each group of actors there are usually heterogeneous sub-groups, and the incentives and accountability relationships that work for one group may be different from those that work for other groups. When accountability fails, the failure can be tracked either to the long route between providers and users through policymakers, or to the short route between service providers and users directly.
Sometimes improving the long route is a long-term process and, in some situations, may not be doable. In these cases, the WDR 2004 suggests strengthening the short route between providers and users ( Figure 1 ).
Figure 1: An Accountability Framework
Source: World Bank (2003) .
SBM is a direct reflection of this -short-route‖ approach. What successful education systems share appears to be a working structure of accountability: clear objectives, adequate resources, and capable and motivated providers. Institutional reforms should aim at strengthening the system of accountability, not only relying on the improvement of some proximate determinants of success, such as curriculum design, pedagogical methods, textbooks, teacher training, school construction, or new information technologies.
The 2004 WDR presented evidence that increasing school autonomy and accountability can help solve some of the most fundamental problems in education.
According to existing evidence, while increasing resource flows and other support to the education sector is necessary, it is also critical to translate these resources into basic services that can reach the clients. Schools should be given some autonomy in using their inputs and be held accountable to the users for using these inputs efficiently. The literature that promotes the use of SBM generally points to three tenets for improving service delivery: (i) increasing client choice and participation (-voice‖) ; (ii) building effective and autonomous frontline providers and organizations (-management‖); and (iii) making information widely available, and using the information to strengthen the rewards for delivering effective services and penalize those who fail to deliver (-compact‖) .
The worldwide evidence on school-based management is well summarized in -Decentralized Decision-Making in Schools‖ (World Bank, 2009) . The general finding is that SBM shows positive results on mainly reducing grade repetition and failure, and improving teacher attendance rates, contrasted with the mixed results in test scores.
II. Indonesian context
Indonesia is a very large country geographically, with more than 200,000 schools nationwide. Decentralizing service delivery is a natural response to concerns about the ability of central policymakers to respond to the needs of a large and diverse country. The idea of the school committee is based on the enlargement of the old style BP3 (Parents-Teachers Association) and aimed at accommodating wider participation from the parents and the community, empowering them in decision making, and holding schools accountable so as to improve education access and quality on the ground. The expectation was that SBM would lead to more efficient use of resources and improved student achievement. The Decree explicitly stipulates that SC objectives should include:
(1) to accommodate aspirations of the community on operational policies and education sector programs at the education unit (school level); (2) to encourage more community roles in education provision at the school level; and (3) to facilitate the establishment of education service provision at the school level in a transparent and accountable manner.
Education Law No. 20/2003 also defines the District Education Board as an independent body representing civil society at the district level with the aim of improving education service delivery. The committee supports this improvement by: (1) providing advice to assist in determining the school program and policy; (2) providing support such as financial support, ideas, and activities for the implementation of the school program; (3) providing control over school programs for transparency and accountability; and (4) providing mediation and communication between the school and the community.
Compared to international practices particularly in Latin America, the practice of SBM in Indonesian is very much limited in public schools. The majority of the teachers are public civil servants, whom the schools have no power to hire or fire. In theory, schools have only control over non-salary operational expenditures, even though the discretionary resources are commonly used to hire additional contract teachers.
International partners have supported SBM in Indonesia for more than 10 years. There is a small but growing research literature devoted to school-based management in Indonesia. The evidence on school committees is based mainly on qualitative case studies across a range of provinces. The SMERU Institute studies from 2005 and 2008 focused on school committee participation in school management, as well as the school budgeting process that accompanies receiving the BOS block grants (RAPBS). They found school committees were often dominated by school principals, with the help of selected teachers. Committees generally concentrated in raising funds for the school to use on facilities, and rarely entered into areas related to teaching and learning. Participation within the committees was limited, and often dominated by the committee leader, who may be a respected figure in the community (such as a former school principal). However, these committees were seen as potentially effective communicators of complaints from parents about actions within the school, including disciplinary episodes.
A number of factors appear to contribute to the relatively weak position of the school committee vis-à-vis school personnel, especially the principal. The first is that committees are not perceived as having relevant expertise for entering into questions related to management, teaching and learning. Another factor was referred to as an institutional legitimacy issue, since the school principal receives his/her decree from the district office, while the school committee is appointed locally. Finally, with the introduction of the -School Operational Assistance‖ 2 (Batuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS) grants, one of the main historical functions of the school committees-raising funds-has been reduced in importance (SMERU, 2005 (SMERU, , 2008 .
The school's use of the BOS grant money is another area of research. The main benefit from the program appears to be the supplanting of school-based fees, at least in rural areas (SMERU, 2008) . This does not mean that local fees have been abolished, but the additional funds appear to be used to purchase the materials and inputs that were financed largely by parental fees before. This in turn has positive implications for participation, since the price of school has in effect been lowered.
As for how schools use the grant money, the evidence is mixed. As mentioned in Sweeting et al. (2003-07) , on the one hand there are instances of qualitative improvements, for example, through enhanced teacher training. But the evidence suggests a general emphasis on materials and physical infrastructure, rather than learning processes. Also, not every community has necessarily welcomed the BOS program. In some urban areas there is evidence of schools declining BOS in favor of maintaining a school fee system that generates more resources, although this puts more pressure on the poorest families. In other areas there are concerns about district-level diverting of the funds. Finally, there is the concern raised above that one side effect of the BOS program is that it indirectly weakens the position of the school committee given its historical role as local fundraiser. Consistent with national data, the average size of the sampled primary school is small, at 180 students on average per school. The student-teacher ratio is generally low, around 15:1. Schools' discretionary resource envelopes, excluding public civil service teachers' salaries that are directly paid to teachers, is also in general small, but varies from region to region.
III
The survey aims at capturing the current practice of SBM in Indonesia, after nearly 10 years of its principles written into law. The survey has shown that in general the scope of SBM continues to be very limited in Indonesian public primary schools. In terms of the first key tenet of SBM -parental choice, participation, and voice, 90%
3 These are the public primary schools under the auspices of the Ministry of National Education, comprising about 90 percent of total primary schools in Indonesia. The other 10% mostly include private schools and the schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (mostly private schools). 4 The survey also included 54 public junior secondary schools, one in each sampled district. This paper focuses on the 400 public primary schools only. In comparison, school committees largely feel less control of school decisionmaking. School committees report that their most influential area is community-school relations, following by planning for school facility improvement. Around half of the school committees in the survey responded that they had little or no influence on school vision and mission, budget allocation and work plan. The least influenced areas by school committees fall under the -professional control‖ side of the school: textbooks choice, school calendar, curriculum, and teacher management.
The dichotomy of principal vs. school committee on school management is to some extent understandable within the institutional context. With the ownership of the Indonesian public schools still falls under the government, and generally categorized as -technical unit‖ in the government structure with assigned budget headings, the principal, as an appointed government employee, is responsible for this -unit‖ and allocated public budget. With increased share of public funding at school level in recent years, it is natural to expect that the principal's role is likely to be enlarged.
The third tenet of SBM is transparency and accountability. Regarding information flow from schools to parents, the report card on individual child's academic performance, mostly semester test results, is regularly sent to parents, and they are generally easy for parents to understand ( Figure 7 ). 
How understandable is report card
Beyond report cards on students' performance at school, other information regarding school activities and management is not commonly communicated to parents.
Only about 20% of the parents surveyed responded that they received some information on overall school performance 5 . Similarly quite low share of parents reported that they learned anything about school finance or were encouraged to volunteer in school activities. Only half of the parents interviewed actually received any information about school and student activities ( Figure 8 , left panel). This doubt is somewhat verified by the responses of schools and districts on the pressure they felt for improving education quality. Of those surveyed, 68% of the principals and 63% of the district education officers responded that there was little to no pressure from parents to improve education. The school committees, district education boards (DEB), and school inspectors seem to view the pressure as slightly higher.
However, they are in general on the -giving‖ end, but not the -receiving‖ end of the pressure, and thus may have biased views on the pressure that parents actually put on schools ( Figure 9 ). The bottom-up pressure from parents seems weak in Indonesia's public primary schools, but the top-down pressure from government supervisory bodies is slightly more significant. Figure 10 shows that schools are frequently visited by school inspectors from the district education office. Schools on average receive nearly 6 visits by the district school inspectors per year. This is somewhat verified by the district's response that quarterly and monthly school visits are common by the districts. What happened during and after the district's visit to schools? Even though the visits are frequent, it seems that the key aspects of quality assurance and consequences are missing from these visits. For example, monitoring instruction inside classrooms is not commonly covered during these visits, and reviewing the school budget is also not a routine task of the supervisors. This leads to the question of what the feedback given to principals and teachers is mostly based on, or whether the evaluations and feedback, together with other inspection areas (i.e. school facility and administrative procedures) are superficial.
In addition, the consequences for poor performance rarely lead to any high-stake actions. The most common measure taken for a low-performing principal is a transfer to another school or placement with a mentor. Demotion and firing would only happen with more serious offenses (Figure 11 ). In brief, Indonesia has joined the global trend of decentralization of educational decision-making. Schools are empowered to make decisions on administrative and technical matters. However, Indonesia does not seem to get the best from the current SBM practice. The level of parental participation, transparency, and accountability needs to be elevated to enable the country to reap the full benefit of SBM in improving the quality of education.
IV. Estimating the effects of school decision-making
This section provides empirical evidence on whether school level decisionmaking actually leads to improved education outcomes in Indonesia. The scope of school decision-making in the country is still limited, given that a majority of teachers are civil servants, who are assigned to schools. Therefore decision-making at the school level is limited to its relatively small discretionary resource envelope. But there are key areas in which schools can and have been making choices. We look into two of these areas:
hiring non-civil servant (contract) teachers, and allocating discretionary resources. We examine what factors are associated with school choices, and how these choices affect student learning outcomes at the school level.
We follow an analytical framework as graphed in Figure 12 . As depicted, school outcome is determined by three sets of factors: the school's capacity to deliver results; the school's drive and actions for results; as well as students' family and community background. The school's drive and actions for results are of particular interest in the context of SBM: they are affected by how much autonomy schools have, together with the extent to which schools are held accountable for their results. Schools can be held accountable by parents and communities (bottom-up accountability), as well by government supervisory bodies (top-down accountability). In Indonesia, the former is often regarded as through the school committee, and the latter, the district education office.
The approach for empirical estimation is summarized in Table 1 . A two-step procedure is used to address the endogeneity of school decision variables when explaining the school outcome. As summarized in Table 1 , the first step estimates school decision equations of (1) school budget allocation for student activities, particularly in support of learning such as remedial learning activities; and (2) the number of non-civil service (-non-PNS‖) teachers hired by schools. We also include in the first step the estimation of one important intermediate outcome measure: teacher attendance rate. The predicted values of the first step dependent variables will serve as key variables to explain the school outcome: test scores of Indonesian language and math.
While school capacity variables such as principal and teachers' qualification and experiences enter both equations, the -accountability‖ variables only affect school outcomes through influencing school decision-making, and thus they are excluded from the 2 nd step estimation. In the meantime, parental educational background and resources are regarded as only affecting learning outcome directly. This is a reasonable assumption as highly educated or well-heeled parents can only be highly influential if they are involved in school activities in the first place. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation are presented in Annex 1.
The sample includes 383 schools. 13 schools in the survey actually responded that they do not have school committees, and thus are excluded from the sample. Using discretionary funding for hiring non-civil service teachers seems to be a common phenomenon, even though the student-teacher ratio is very low at average of 15:1 for the sample. On average, 30% of the teachers in the surveyed schools are non-civil service teachers ( Figure 13 ). Teacher absenteeism has been an issue in Indonesia. Chaudhury et al (2006) reported that 19% of Indonesian teachers were absent from work. Our survey relies on the principal's estimate, and has a much better record of 6% absence rate. However, the variations remain large from school to school.
We use the average test scores for Indonesian language and math to measure the school outcome. The test is administered to the Grade 5 students in surveyed schools, and designed based on the core curriculum requirements. Students generally fair better in language than in math. Language test score also shows smaller standard deviation than math score. The results of first step estimates are presented in Table 2 6 . For schools' direct spending on student activities, in addition to the significant effect of schools' total budget and total enrollment, the result shows that the amount of spending is significantly affected by the influence of districts or subdistricts. Schools that reported districts/subdistrict as -very influential‖ over schools -planning and budget allocation‖ allocated more funds directly to support student activities. In addition, schools that send parents information on BOS spending also spend more on their students directly. Schools with a committee chair with at least senior secondary education also tend to spend more on students. Somewhat consistent with the effect of the district/subdistrict's influence, schools with more teachers trained at the district level during the previous year also allocate greater spending on students.
The district/subdistrict's influence is also shown in the school's decision to hire non-civil service teachers. It seems that when there is more influence of districts on schools' -professional‖ aspect (i.e., selection of textbooks and other instructional materials), schools are more likely to hire additional non-civil servant teachers. Various school committee-related activities appear to have different effects on teacher hiring.
Schools that report student performance to their school committees tend to hire more teachers. In the mean time, more active schools committees -as reflected by more frequently reporting of committee activities to parents; or more school committee meetings with parents and communities -seem to reduce the additional teacher hiring.
Controlling for total enrollment, schools with fewer civil-service teachers do tend to hire more non-civil service teachers. This shows that hiring additional teachers does have a compensatory effect, equalizing the student-teacher ratio across schools. One interesting finding is that better teacher management and training is negatively associated with additional teacher hiring. The results in Table 3 show that the share of teachers in schools receiving evaluations from the principal, and the share of teachers receiving training on handling classroom discipline issues and general classroom management, have significant and negative effects on additional teacher hiring. This may reflect a quality-quantity trade-off of teachers. The teacher attendance rate also seems to be significantly affected by how much the district/subdistrict influences the schools. However, the results show that a district's -administrative influence‖ (i.e., influence on school planning and budgeting) has a positive effect, while its -professional influence‖ (i.e., influence on textbook selection) seems to have a negative effect on teachers' attendance rate. The school committee appears to have a significant effect on teacher attendance. We have found that schools with committees receiving teacher performance reports have significantly higher teacher attendance rates. An experienced and better educated school committee chair is also associated with better teacher attendance 7 . spending on student activities, the number of non-civil service teachers, and the teacher attendance rate all have significant effects on math scores, controlling for other school and parent characteristics. In the meantime, only the teacher attendance rate shows a significant effect on language scores.
Teacher quality and management stand out as important factors in test scores.
Both the share of teachers receiving training from districts or other sources, and the share of teachers receiving performance evaluations from principals have a significant effect on test scores. One result that might be comforting is that the share of certified teachers is highly correlated with higher test scores, for both language and math. This at least shows that the on-going teacher certification process does identify good teachers.
The results also shows that whether a school is a national standard school or an international standard school does not matter in terms of learning outcomes measured by test scores, and nor does the accreditation of a school. This may indicate the weakness of one of most important aspects of the school quality assurance system in Indonesia. 
V. Conclusions
The global trend of school-based management follows the principle of decentralized decision-making, putting power in the hands of the frontline providers and parents to improve their schools, aiming at improving education beyond providing more classrooms, more teachers, and more textbooks. The idea behind decentralized decision making and management is that the frontline providers and clients know best what they
want, and what goes on in schools and other public service provision facilities.
This paper examines the key aspects of the practices of school-based management currently in Indonesia, and its effect on education quality. Using a conceptual framework of an accountability system of public service delivery, this paper explores the relations among parents, school committees, schools, and government education supervisory bodies from three tenets: participation and voice; autonomy; and accountability. The paper's empirical approach allows a close examination of how these aspects affect school decision-making on key educational inputs, which significantly affect student learning outcomes.
Using the data from a nationally representative survey of about 400 public primary schools in Indonesia, the paper finds that the level of parental participation and voice in school management is quite low in Indonesia. While the role of school committees is still limited to community relations, school facilities, and other administrative areas of schools, the school principal, together with teachers, is very much empowered to assert professional control of the school. The most important finding of this paper is that the accountability system is very weak in Indonesia's school system, which is reflected in inadequate information flow to parents, as well as seemingly low parental awareness of holding schools accountable. The accountability arrangement of the Indonesian school system currently puts more emphasis on top-down supervision and monitoring. Even though the interactions between district or subdistrct education offices and schools are generally frequent, the lack of rewards and sanctions for good or bad performance also leaves the system weak.
The empirical work of this paper shows that although the scope of school-based management in Indonesia is limited today, it has begun to help schools make the right decisions on allocation of resources and hiring additional (non-civil servant) teachers, and to create an enabling environment for learning, including increasing the teacher attendance rate. All these aspects are found to have significantly positive effects on student learning outcomes.
The results of this paper may also contribute to the rethinking of teacher management reforms in Indonesia. Hiring non-civil servant teachers by schools has been controversial as it is often perceived as inadequate spending and waste of resources given that the overall civil servant teachers are more than sufficient in numbers relative to the total number of students. In the meantime, an increasing number of non-civil service teachers are queuing to become civil service teachers, creating pressure on expanding the size of the civil service. The findings of this paper show that rather than in an ad hoc manner, schools do hire non-civil service teachers in compensation for the smaller numbers (relatively) of civil-service teachers at school. More importantly, non-civil service teachers contribute significantly to student learning. We argue that this contribution may not be because of the total number of teachers per se, as decreasing the student-pupil ratio from 20:1 (without non-civil service teachers) to 15:1 (with civil service teachers) cannot provide a convincing explanation of the improvement of learning outcomes based on a vast amount of international experience. Rather, non-civil service teachers may have very different characteristics from the current civil service teachers:
they are generally younger, and many are fresh from college, and with updated knowledge. They may be also more motivated to earn -job security‖. These hypotheses are yet to be tested. 
Annex 1: Sample Summary Statistics

